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ABSTRACT
Today's housing problems are no longer isolated to the ill housed as
increasingly the realities of housing needs permeate our society.
Affordable housing is a pervasive issue in the United States and must be
addressed. High housing costs have limited homeownership opportunities for
young households and increasing numbers of low income households compete for
the dwindling supply of low cost housing both on the homeownership and rental
side. Housing price increases during the 1970s and the reduction of federal
subsidies combined to create growing problems of affordability and quality.
Although affordability presents problems for many households, low income
households have been impacted the hardest. Nearly two-thirds of all poor
families live in housing that costs more than they can afford. Three trends
underscore this contention: (1) the poor lost income at a historically rapid pace
during the inflation of the 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s; (2)
housing costs increased faster for the poor than for any other group; and (3)
reductions in federal housing subsidies were realized fully in the late 1980s.
Given the federal government's retrenchment in housing, the burden has
been placed on the states to provide affordable housing. States have responded
by creating housing finance agencies which exhibit varying levels of
sophistication and activism in regard to state housing programs, housing finance,
and regulatory powers. A comparative study was performed to examine the
ability of states to manage successfully housing programs. Three states -
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland - were selected, based on their
commitment to affordable housing, activist leadership, innovative reputation and
accessibility. In each state a rental production program was chosen. The
program's strengths and weaknesses were illustrated, compared, and then
evaluated as to success.
The results demonstrate that these states have shown a commitment and
increasing capacity to undertake major housing initiatives. Yet, new challenges,
such as varying housing market and state fiscal conditions, face the agencies in
the 1990s demanding that they continue to foster entrepreneurial efforts.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Title: Visiting Professor of Urban Studies & Planning
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INTRODUCTION
America is increasingly becoming a nation of
housing have and have-nots.
William Apgar
The United States faces many serious housing issues, i.e.
homelessness, housing unaffordability, declining rates of
homeownership, the loss of low income housing due to the retreating
role of the federal government and available subsidies, an inadequate
amount of housing stock and concerns over expiring use. Affordable
housing lies at the root of many of these issues and must be
addressed, particularly for low income households. While it is true
that homeownership presents problems for many households, the
number of households suffering from first time buying affordability
problems is significantly smaller than the number suffering from low
income affordability problems. Anthony Downs illustrates this point
by noting that an estimate of total housing sales both new and
existing would approximate 5 percent of the total number of
households. He estimates that the fraction of total sales likely to
involve first time home buyers would be 40 percent, which means
that approximately 2 percent of all households might be potential
first time homebuyers in any given year. Moreover, in 1979 the
median income of first time homebuyers was $25,230 or 53 percent
higher than the median income of all households in that year
($16,461). The median income of renter households in 1979 was
only $10,000. Therefore in 1979 the median income of first time
homebuyers was 2.5 times that of renters, which clearly illustrates
that this group does not require financial assistance nearly as much
as renters as a group, particularly low income renters. 1  Low income
households are defined at those with annual incomes below 50
percent of the median household incomes in their areas.
Housing price increases during the 1970s and reduced federal
subsidies during the 1980s have exacerbated the affordability
problem for all Americans but have most seriously impacted the
poor. The majority of poor people are renters as indicated by the
National Housing Task Force, which reported that in 1987 63 percent
of all poverty level households were living in rental housing. A
growing dysfunction in the housing market for low income
households has been seen in recent years. This disparity between
rent and income has increased. From 1980 to 1986 real rents
increased by 15 percent nationwide and are at their highest levels in
twenty years. Areas characterized by strong economic growth have
1 Downs, Anthony. A Strategy for Designing a Fully Comprehensive National
Housing Policy for the Federal Government of the United States, (March, 1988),
p. 20.
experienced even more dramatic rent increases, 20 percent in the
Northeast and 25 percent in the West. 2 This group lost income at a
historically rapid pace during the inflationary period of the 1970s
and recession of the early 1980s. At the beginning of the 1970s poor
families spent 30% of their income for housing but by 1985 they
were spending 58% for housing. 3  In addition, the nation lost more
than 4.5 million housing units between 1973 and 1983 due to
displacement, abandonment, and upgrading, almost half of which
were occupied by low income households. During this time real
median incomes of all renters fell by 12 percent. 4 The effects on low
income renter households have been devastating. From 1974 to
1983 the number of households below 50 percent of median income
increased by over 5 million while the number of units affordable at
35 percent of income actually decreased by over 300,000.5 The
affordability gap has widened particularly for the low income
household.
2 Council of State Community Affairs Agencies, The States and Housing:
Responding to the Challenge, Housing Production, (May 13-14, 1988), p. 7.
3 Ford Foundation, Affordable Housing: The Years Ahead (August, 1989), p. 13.
4 The Report of the National Housing Task Force, A Decent Place to Live,
(March, 1988), p. 6.
5Council of State Community Affairs Agencies, The States and Housing:
Responding to the Challenge, Housing Production, (May 13-14, 1988), p. 7.
It must be noted that the affordability problem is not only a
social concern but also an economic one. High housing prices in
Massachusetts make it extremely difficult for the area to grow as
firms find it hard to recruit new employees which drives up wages
and results in a less competitive position for Massachusetts' firms.
Walter Palmer, an officer of Raytheon Company, believes that "People
don't even apply for jobs in the Boston area because they know about
the high cost of housing." 6  Heinz Muehlmann, an economist at the
Associated Industries of Massachusetts, states that "The difference
between housing prices in the Midwest and here is so enormous that
they are almost impossible to compensate by higher wages." 7 Thus,
as one can imagine the issue of affordable housing has far reaching
implications.
Housing subsidies traditionally provided by the federal
government have been the mainstay of the affordable housing
program. Government intervention was first witnessed in the 1890s
but did not really become a movement until the 1930s when
government supported began to expand rapidly. Yet by the end of
the 1970s the federal government's momentum had slowed
considerably and would soon be reversing. Production subsidies
6 The Boston Herald, October 21, 1987.
71bid.
which one targeted the supply side to create new housing changed
course and focused on demand side subsidies which aided in reducing
the cost of housing for low and moderate income households by
improving their purchasing power in the existing housing market.
Such subsidies encourage rehabilitation rather than new construction.
Support for subsidized housing plummeted from $30 billion in 1981
to less than $8 billion in 1989.8 The withdrawal of federal assistance
coupled with the adverse affects of the 1986 tax law, primarily the
reduced usability of tax exempt bonds for housing and substantially
lessened incentives for constructing privately financed rental
housing, has placed increasing demands on the states' ability to
target, provide, and regulate housing.
In order to replace HUD's activism, many states have embarked
on several programs including the establishment of housing finance
agencies. Although the approach and degree of success of state
housing initiatives vary, the diversity of responses illustrates the
desire and ability of states to undertake housing programs. States
are ideally situated to manage this responsibility as they possess
resources and information of both local and federal levels and have
powers not available to either. They have the requisite skill and
8Ford Foundation, Affordable Housing: The Years Ahead (August, 1989), p. 13.
expertise in the management of programs and also have an
understanding of the sensitivity to local housing issues.
This thesis will examine the role and strategies of states
regarding their ability to manage housing programs. Specifically I
will investigate three states, namely Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Maryland which were selected as a result of their high level of
commitment to affordable housing, activist leadership, and
innovative reputation, the changing environment (for instance, the
bursting of the Massachusetts miracle), and accessibility. In each
state I will evaluate a rental production program, i.e. in
Massachusetts the State Housing Assistance for Rental Production
Program, in Rhode Island the Rental Production Program and in
Maryland the Rental Housing Production Program. The strengths and
weaknesses of each program will be illustrated through comparative
analysis in order to share some lessons from these experiences. An
evaluation of the success of the programs will be based on five
criteria: the number of units produced, the realized intent of the
program, cost effectiveness, adaptability to varying housing market
and economic circumstances, and state support. My concentration on
rental programs stems from the fact that as illustrated earlier
homeownership represents only a small fraction of the housing
problem, whereas affordability for renters, particularly low income
renters, is the major dilemma and this group is in much greater need
of assistance.
Chapter I will present an overview of the federal government's
involvement in housing and its pursuant withdrawal as well as the
states' response to this shift in responsibilities. Chapter II will
discuss generic subsidy strategies and introduce the Massachusetts
environment and SHARP program. Chapter III will present Rhode
Island's experience with the Rental Production Program and Chapter
IV will examine Maryland's initiative. Chapter V will serve as a
forum for comparison and present some lessons and
recommendations.
CHAPTER I
A Change in Housing Policy
Housing policy and the federal government's involvement in
this area can be divided into five periods, namely: the 1890s
through the 1930s characterized by deep concern over living
conditions and public health and safety; the 1930s through the 1950s
with the initiation of production oriented programs and the
dominance of public housing projects; the 1960s when deep targeted
subsidies for the poor emerged and low income housing production
shifted to private developers; the 1970s with a moratorium on
production and a change to income based programs; and the 1980s
marked by a retrenchment of federal involvement and support as
evidenced by the removal of federal subsidies and tax reform.
The federal government first intervened in housing when in
1892 Congress authorized a commission to explore the horrendous
living conditions of the nation's largest cities. The dilapidated slum
like dwellings posed a considerable threat to public health and
safety. Although the Congressional initiative was not pursued
immediately by further federal efforts, this action spurred a series of
private, state and local government initiatives commonly known as
the Tenement House Reform movement. 9 The noteworthy result of
the movement was the enactment of various new or improved
building and house codes founded on concerns over public health.
Government intervention was evidenced during the Great
Depression most notably through public housing slum clearance and
Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance for the middle
class. Soon after World War II, further government involvement in
housing was witnessed, partly inspired by the need to rehouse
returning veterans. In 1949 the passage of the Urban
Redevelopment Act declared the government's commitment to a
"decent home in a suitable environment for every American
family." 10
The 1960s' efforts were initiated during President Kennedy's
New Frontier and expanded during President Johnson's Great Society.
This period was characterized by an enormous increase in subsidies
for housing production, the focusing of benefits to low and moderate
income families, and attempts to make private enterprise the main
means of providing subsidized shelter. Such efforts were not only a
response to the recent public awareness of pervasive poverty but
9 Ford Foundation, Affordable Housing: The Years Ahead (August, 1989), p. 2.
10 The Report of the National Housing Task Force, A Decent Place to Live,
(March, 1988), p. 2.
also a recognition of the growing problems of the near poor, those
above public housing but below FHA-VA levels. A multitude of
subsidized rental housing programs targeted the in-betweens,
primarily in the form of below market rate mortgages. Although still
a predominantly private housing market, the federal government
during this time became a main actor as it controlled a
comprehensive system of mortgage insurance and subsidies.
From 1961 to 1973 subsidized housing grew from 460,000
units to more than 1.5 million units and for the first time subsidies
were based on income. 11 Also the new housing programs were
designed particularly to spur private ownership of units. Yet, not
until 1969 and the enactment of the Brooke Amendment did public
housing become available to the nation's poorest families. 12 This
Amendment limited the rent public housing residents paid to twenty
five percent of their household income. In addition, a creative first
time tax policy initiative was developed to encourage support for the
production of low and moderate income housing which enhanced
returns to investors. Tax exempt bonds were authorized to finance
privately developed units leased by local public housing authorities,
11Ford Foundation, Affordable Housing: The Years Ahead (August, 1989), p. 28.
12 Ibid.
and introduced into the tax code were accelerated depreciation
schedules for low income housing.
The growth of federal housing programs although impressive
encountered tough criticism. Housing proponents claimed that
developers were reaping excessive profits and developers
complained that HUD was extremely inefficient as administrative
delays were costly. Also double digit inflation coupled with rising
utility and maintenance costs outpaced incomes which further
increased the affordability gap. Defaults in several subsidized
programs combined with the 1972 demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe
public housing project in St. Louis led to an increasing national
awareness of public housing difficulties in management and design. 13
Given these problems President Nixon in 1973 declared a
moratorium on all federal housing programs and developed a
National Housing Policy Review, which emphasized two main
findings, i.e. that housing programs should concentrate on the family
rather than the unit and housing assistance should be focused on the
income of this household rather than the cost of the unit. With this
aim in mind, the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act
shifted priorities from the old "supply side" (production orientation)
programs to various Section 8 "demand side" programs; this program
1 3Ford Foundation, Affordable Housing: The Years Ahead (August, 1989), p. 30.
shift altered the course of federal housing policy. The Section 8
subsidy provides an income supplement for qualifying households
(initially those with incomes up to 80 percent of area median;
currently those with incomes up to 50 percent of area median).
Section 8 recipients originally paid 25 percent of their income in rent
(now 30 percent) with the subsidy covering the remainder up to a
predetermined fair market rent.
By the end of the 1970s most of the programs introduced in
the 1960s were phased out and replaced by programs with similar
intent but a different orientation. Private investment in housing was
encouraged through increased tax incentives and tax exempt bond
financing became available for Section 8 and other projects that
reserved a specified amount of their units for qualifying households.
At the close of the decade it was evident that the housing
programs were no longer growing. In 1981 President Reagan's
Commission on Housing concluded that future housing policy should
focus on housing affordability with less emphasis placed on housing
production and rehabilitation. Housing vouchers, an income aid
similar to the Experimental Housing Allowance Program, were
introduced and the commission proposed the termination of all four
Section 8 programs. Two other programs were also added, namely
the Housing Development Action Grant (HODAG) and the Rental
Rehabilitation Grant program. The former program is a one time
grant used to subsidize construction or rehabilitation costs for
projects in which 20 percent of the units are targeted for low income
households, while the latter program involves city competition for
block grants that are used to subsidize moderate rehabilitation. Each
grant is matched by a Section 8 subsidy. Both programs continue to
operate but at very modest funding levels.
Reductions in funding for housing programs were a common
occurrence during the 1980s as the federal government all but
removed itself from housing as evidenced by a more than 70 percent
decline during the decade in annual allocations for federally
subsidized units. Such federal retrenchment forced the states to take
responsibility for housing programs. Previously they were mere
spectators, yet recently they were compelled to take a much more
pro-active role in housing. States' resourcefulness became evident as
many soon developed housing policy, managed housing programs,
provided housing finance mechanisms, and assumed the role of
regulator, planner, and partner in residential land use decisions.
Given the withdrawal of federal support for low income
housing in the 1980s, many states and local governments,
community groups, nonprofits, and low income housing developers
have responded with creative measures to address a diverse range of
housing needs. The federal government's retreat from the housing
business left a void which demanded state activism in particular.
States have only recently become involved in housing in relation to
local agencies. The vast majority of state housing programs are less
than a decade old and many states have funded housing programs
from their own revenues only within the past seven or eight years.
Many states have introduced housing programs and have
contributed significant resources to them like Massachusetts, while
others have yet to make serious inroads. The state level of
commitment to housing varies considerably amongst states and their
approach to participation tends to be incremental often spurred by a
major housing dilemma.
The 1970s witnessed state and local government creation of
Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs) which complemented federal
housing programs. Under federal law HFAs issue tax exempt housing
bonds which underwrite new construction of rental housing. Tax
exempt status enables lower mortgage interest rates to be offered.
Qualifications for tax exempt financing demand that developers
reserve a particular percentage of the housing they build for low
income households. Such tax exempt bonds have been extremely
valuable over the years from a rental production standpoint. In fact
for the first half of 1985 tax exempt financing exceeded the total for
all of 1984.
States have primarily employed industrial development bonds
(IDBs) to provide financing for the development of rental housing.
IDB use has centered around increasing the stock of rental housing
with over 95 percent of multi-family IDBs used to fund new
construction and substantial rehabilitation of apartments. 14 The
countercyclical element of tax exempt bonds is an extremely
important feature. Yet, due to the loss of federal revenues from such
bonds the 1986 Tax Reform Act limited the amount of bonds each
state could issue and set tougher affordability standards resulting in
a decreased contribution to housing finance programs.
In addition, some states are reclaiming some of the land use
and other regulatory powers which were formerly delegated to cities
and towns as inefficient practices, and disputes at the local level over
land use and growth rarely provided affordable housing in the best
interests of low income households, as the "not in my back yard"
opinion dominated many communities. This dilemma raises the
question of the appropriate level of government. Housing is a very
local issue with specific market conditions, actors, and land use policy
14 Terner, Ian and Cook, Thomas. New Directions for Federal Housing Policy:
The Role of the States (March, 1988), p. 17.
demanding adaptability to local circumstances. These factors require
that subsidy programs be managed by a governmental agency which
understands the intricacies of the local market. As illustrated the
parochial tendencies of many local governments suggest that local
control would be ill-advised. A lack of expertise or interest in
providing affordable housing on the part of cities and towns can pose
considerable problems and obstacles. In order to achieve larger
housing objectives it is necessary for the government agency to take
a broader perspective regarding housing issues. Also, although
housing is a local concern housing markets tend to operate on a
metropolitan or regional level rather than a city level.
Anthony Downs contends that the metropolitan level is the
most appropriate level of government for the administration of
housing programs as the decision makers are near enough to
comprehend local concerns but removed enough to take a regional
outlook. Yet, Downs notes that very few functioning metropolitan
governments exist and the development of new regional bodies
would prove most difficult due to political and bureaucratic
considerations. Given this situation Downs believes that the state is
best positioned to administer federal housing resources. 15  States'
political and managerial machinery which can be used to explore,
15Ibid., p. 5.
comprehend, and target housing policies coupled with their expertise
in public finance, the management of programs and allocation of
funds between competing claims, uniquely situates states to fulfill
this demanding role. States can understand local realities and
possess regulatory powers over local land use decisions which are
constitutionally prohibited from the federal government. Other
resources which state governments afford to low-income housing
development include appropriated funds, dedicated state revenues,
tax incentives, credit enhancement, etc.
States' competence to undertake this role depends on a variety
of state attributes and characteristics, i.e. leadership, commitment to
housing, size, wealth and resources, particular economic conditions,
traditions, development of efficient and proper agencies, and their
ability to coordinate diverse resources and various players in the
operation of housing programs, as well as target programs to meet
specific needs, etc. As such conditions vary among states so too will
their ability to manage their housing responsibilities. In order to
gain further insight into states' commitment and ability to operate
housing programs, it is necessary to explore the situation in greater
detail and it is this charge that I now undertake.
CHAPTER II
Subsidies and the Massachusetts Experience
Before describing the rental production programs of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, I will present a brief
overview of subsidy strategies, as outlined by Downs -namely, the
demand side subsidy and the supply side subsidy. 1 6  I will
concentrate more on the latter as it directly increases new rental
housing supply.
The demand side subsidy strategy emphasizes either housing
vouchers paid directly to low income households or rent supplements
paid to their landlords. Many housing observers believe that this is
the best approach in areas that experience soft rental housing
markets, but in tight rental markets it may be necessary to subsidize
construction of new rental units. Other forms of housing assistance
target existing housing units rather than add to supply and attempt
to maintain or improve the units' condition. These include
rehabilitating existing units and precluding them from becoming
market rate. Historically, rehabilitation programs have been divided
into three categories according to the level of work performed on the
units: substantial rehabilitation can be as expensive per unit as new
16 Downs, Anthony. A Strategy for Designing a Fully Comprehensive National
Housing Policy for the Federal Government of the United States, (March, 1988),
pp. 53-56.
construction; and moderate, and minor rehabilitation costing less per
unit than new construction but more than housing vouchers. Though
the former increase the supply of quality units, generally the
vouchers do not.
There are four basic supply side subsidy strategies. The first is
the hidden subsidy of tax benefits to homeowners. Here it is hoped
that even without a direct subsidy, improvements in low income
housing will ultimately occur from the "trickle-down" process (where
upper and middle income households vacate their once new housing
units as time passes and move into newer units, and other
households farther down in the income distribution move in). There
are several problems regarding the "trickle-down" process, however.
By the time the old units reach the affordability level of the low
income households many units are deteriorated and in disrepair.
Also, discrimination can pose a formidable obstacle to the process.
Moreover, as the early 1980s indicated, this mechanism encounters
great difficulty whenever new housing starts fall low relative to the
total of net new household formations and removals of housing from
the stock. Such a process often forces many poor households to live
together in the most dilapidated conditions and neighborhoods.
A second approach - the deep subsidy strategy - provides
directly subsidized new units for low income households. Large
subsidies are needed due to the high cost of new units relative to the
rent paying abilities of this income group. Attention and resources
are focused on the households with the greatest needs, but the large
amount of subsidy needed per household necessarily means that
such programs can only influence and assist a small number of
people. The percentage of income eligible households who will
receive such subsidies is very low. The addition to the total housing
supply is no way near as great as would be provided by spreading
the same subsidy broadly, but shallowly.
There also can be a resulting small spillover gain to all low
income households, even to those who do not receive the direct
subsidy benefit, when total supply of units increases. This gain
arises from the situation where total supply increases faster than
total demand, thereby exerting downward pressure on the rents of
units in the proximity sharing the same income characteristics.
Again, a shallow subsidy program that produces more units should
produce more of this spillover. Measurable positive spillover effects
occur only when the number of new subsidized units is extremely
large as the early 1970s illustrated; with small increases in new
units, spillover effects are unremarkable.
The deep-shallow choice also causes significant concerns of
fairness as deep subsidies provide low income households with new
units which are often of higher quality than the housing of the
taxpayers who are paying for the subsidies. Locational issues are
also controversial as most neighborhoods do not want low income
projects built in their area.
A third approach - a shallow subsidy - has already been
mentioned. It also enables directly subsidized new units to be built
for low income households. As noted, a shallow subsidy provides
more new units for low income households per million dollars of
public funds spent as the average subsidy per household is smaller.
The resultant larger overall increases in the total housing supply can
produce larger spillover effects for unsubsidized low income
households in the area if as previously noted the increase in
subsidized units is sufficiently large. Also these household units are
often developed in conjunction with market rent units in a mixed
income approach, which tends to be more acceptable by nearby
residents than projects comprised totally of low income households.
Finally, a two-sided subsidy strategy employs very shallow
subsidies which due to their shallowness can only assist moderate
income households not low income ones. Once again the savings
through smaller subsidies translates into many new subsidized units
being built. If the amount of units built is large enough, the overall
rental supply downward pressure on rents will be evidenced
throughout the market. Housing vouchers are then deployed to low
income households which enables them to occupy good quality older
units and due to the spillover effect unit rents will be lower. This
two pronged approach appears quite beneficial to low income
households in that it assists housing voucher recipients as well as
those who occupy existing units which have experienced rent
reductions. Yet, once again the main condition of positive spillover
must be present if this strategy is to be effective - i.e. a large
number of new subsidized units must be built each year. This
prerequisite has rarely been met.
As should be apparent, these four approaches are not mutually
exclusive; subsidies can and often are combined in various mixtures.
Such matching can prove fruitful, but one must carefully consider
and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy in
formulating a balanced mix. These approaches, moreover, are
generic and could be used in any state, or for that matter by any
level of government.
With this as a background, we turn now to the specific
programs of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland. To fully
appreciate their design and implementation, one must understand
some of the underlying economic factors and market forces which
shape the housing environment in each state.
Affordable housing has become a major policy issue in
Massachusetts due in part to the pervasiveness of the housing
market imbalances. Low income households are no longer alone in
their plight. Moderate income households - in fact, households on
all rungs of the economic ladder - are affected by escalating prices.
The so-called Massachusetts Miracle and the associated economic
success was indirectly responsible for the problem, as not only did
newly prosperous households encounter cheaper credit and terms
and decide to home shop, but also a dramatic increase in households
trying to locate separate living space led to a sharp increase in
demand for housing relative to available supply. These factors drove
housing prices up for all income groups. During the late 1980s,
media attention highlighted this phenomenon. Across the
Commonwealth (and particularly in the Boston area) people could not
afford to rent or buy housing in their hometowns; and industries
were frustrated in attempts to recruit workers from other areas. The
prosperity of households and the competitiveness of the state's
industries are still being undermined by the high cost of renting and
owning housing.
In the 1970s strong demand for housing from new households
exerted upward pressure on home prices in Massachusetts to such an
extent that they rose more rapidly than the cost of living,
establishing the idea of the home as an inflation hedge and desirable
investment. Unprecedented inflation rates between 1979 and 1982
forced mortgage rates to a level which prevented many potential
buyers from entering the marketplace and hampered sales and price
increases throughout this period. The economic recovery coupled
with a turnaround in interest rates served as a catalyst for the pent-
up demand of the previous years and resulted in an explosion onto
the housing market which underscored the notion of a house as not
only a home but also a nearly certain high yield investment. From
1983 to approximately mid-1985, the median priced home in the
Boston Metropolitan Area became the most expensive median priced
home in the country. 17
If prices had remained stable, of course, rising median incomes
and the steady decline in interest rates from a high of over 17
percent in late 1981 would have made housing more affordable, but
continued home price increases more than offset those factors. The
rate of increase had slowed in the fourth quarter of 1986 and was
the smallest percentage increase since 1984, when home prices in
the Boston area began to increase dramatically. The median home
1 7 Massachusetts Housing Financy Agency Report, The Housing Environment
in Massachusetts (July, 1987), p. 3.
price had increased 15.9 percent within the previous year to
$167,800 and by mid-1987 had risen to $175,000.18
Viewing income, interest rates, and home prices together
provides insight into the affordability gap. Specifically, in
Massachusetts the gap between the income required to finance an
average priced home and the median income in the state grew from
approximately $12,000 in the second quarter of 1983 to almost
$30,000 in the second quarter of 1986. In the latter year, a
household would need an income of over $60,000 to afford a home
priced at the average of $141,000.19 Population structure,
demographics, and changes in lifestyle also have contributed greatly
to market conditions.
Compounding the demand problem were a number of supply
constraints that further restricted its affordability to all income
groups. Labor, materials, and financing costs have kept pace with
inflation (or increased faster than inflation), making new homes as
expensive as existing ones and just as unaffordable for many
budgets. Given lower inflation, building has increased but generally
only in the markets for move up and luxury homes. Perhaps even
18 Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency Report, The Housing Environment
in Massachusetts (July, 1987), p. 11.
19 Ibid., p. 14.
more important, zoning, building codes, and other environmental
controls have limited the supply of developable land, reduced
density, and added significant costs of delay. Developers point to
land transfer taxes where applicable, linkage and other exactions as
exacerbating the problem.
On the other hand, there are several regulatory tools available
to developers to encourage localities to provide their fair share of
land available for low income housing. The most prominent such
"sticks" are Chapter 774, the Anti-Snob Zoning Law and Executive
Order 215. The former statute permits a builder to appeal a local
land development ruling that prohibits low and moderate income
housing to a state board. While the latter mechanism allows the
Executive Office of Communities and Development to block certain
state discretionary funds to a locality if the locality has failed to
provide a broad range of housing choices. Still, on balance
Massachusetts' approach to land development requires developers to
pass various regulatory tests, and an environmentally conscious
public which demands a balanced development program, has
resulted in a reduction in the supply of buildable land and increased
prices for available land. 20
2 0 Council of State Community Affairs Agencies, The States and Housing:
Responding to the Challenge, Building State Housing Capacity, (May 13-14,
1987), p. 36.
Although rental and owner-occupied housing are often
regarded as separate commodities, their markets are in fact closely
intertwined as rising home ownership costs create a ripple effect
through the rental market. Frustrated home buyers crowd the rental
market and bid up rents causing hardship for low income groups.
(The 1980 census reports that renters have on average half the
income of homeowners in Massachusetts.) Unfortunately, the
increases in attainable rents often are burdensome for tenants but
insufficient to spur new construction or rehabilitation of older units.
Landlords thus may be prompted to convert their properties into
condominiums. This accelerates the reduction in supply. Low
income households have been hard hit in the 1980s by economic
recession than by the housing recovery which aided in driving rents
beyond their means.
Demand for rental units increased dramatically during the
early and mid 1980s as a result of the affordability problem in
homeownership and new household formation. Rental vacancy rates,
a proxy for market conditions, rapidly declined during the mid 1980s
to levels below five percent - once considered a minimum threshold
by the federal government. The Rental Housing Association and
Greater Boston Real Estate Board report that vacancies for the state
further declined from 4.1 percent in 1982 to 2.4% in 1986; in turn,
the Boston Redevelopment Authority reported Boston vacancy
declining from 7.5 percent in 1980 to 2.7 percent in 1986.21 Local
housing authority backlogs of applicants and waiting periods of
several years also illustrated the unmet demand at the time.
The context of the supply of rental units was shaped by a
number of factors not least of which was inflation which gathered
momentum in the early 1970s and received bursts from the oil
shocks of 1974 and 1979. Also many areas of the country witnessed
increasing land costs due to fewer buildable parcels, escalating
operating costs (which often outpaced rental income), and rising
financing rates, all of which burdened development. Such economic
stress prompted many developers to reduce maintenance which
sometimes led to abandonment, sale or conversion to condominiums.
A Boston Redevelopment Authority study of households in the City of
Boston reports that the rental component of the housing stock
declined from 33 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1985 while the
number of condominiums rose from 4,610 to 18,439 in the same
period. 2 2  The private sector's shift away from rental housing
contributed to the problems of displacement and homelessness and
2 1Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency Report, The Housing Environment
in Massachusetts (July 1987), p. 22.
2 21bid., p. 25.
were coupled with the federal government's withdrawal of rental
housing production programs has added to the gap between supply
and demand.
Market inefficiencies also caused rental prices to be bid up
dramatically. The Rental Housing Association Industry Surveys
indicate a 38.8 percent nominal increase in median rents statewide
between June 1982 and October 1986; in real terms this amounted to
a 22 percent appreciation rate with Boston in particular experiencing
a 19 percent rise above inflation. 23  The Bureau of Labor Statistics
data regarding the Consumer Price Index was dissected to illustrate
the degree of rent escalations compared to other consumption items
over a fifteen year period. Comparative analysis shows that from
1978 the 1981 Boston metropolitan rents, which in many cases were
regulated by rent control, did not increase as fast as other costs of
living, which translates into a fall in real rents. Yet, in 1981 renters
in the Boston SMSA were no longer enjoying a rent advantage: even
though rent increases slowed from 1981 to 1984 they still far
outpaced inflation. Even more alarming was the fact that from 1984
to 1986 yearly average rent increases rose while inflation decreased;
this continued a three year trend producing the largest real increase
231bid., p. 26.
in rents in nine years. 24  Such factors underscore the mismatch in the
rental marketplace.
Given this rental housing condition in the state a number of
programs were created to address the critical and growing need for
affordable rental housing in the Commonwealth. Among them was
the State Housing Assistance -for Rental Production (SHARP) program
which was enacted in December, 1983, by the Legislature. Various
relevant elements from the SHARP guidelines were extracted in
order to provide an outline of the program. SHARP's primary
purpose was to expand the supply of rental housing in the
Commonwealth; it was not geared toward the repair of basically
sound existing housing. Projects which received SHARP subsidy
generally involved new construction or substantial rehabilitation of
vacant buildings. SHARP was designed to stimulate the production of
privately owned and managed high quality, mixed income rental
housing. Under the mix, at least 25 percent of the units are reserved
for low income households, while the remainder are market rate
units. This expands the supply of low income housing by leveraging
the resource of the Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate and
maximizes the production of affordable housing with the infusion of
a shallow state funded subsidy program.
24Ibid., p. 27.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) provides
construction and permanent financing through the sale of bonds, and
the Executive Office of Communities and Development provides
SHARP funds to write down the cost of interest payments to a level
generally no lower than five percent for a term of no more than 15
years; after that time projects are expected to be self-sustaining. The
state subsidy is a loan, not a grant, and must be repaid to MHFA
which may then be recycled by MHFA to promote further housing
production or otherwise benefit low and moderate income
households. By statute the subsidy must be the minimum amount
necessary to ensure project feasibility.
SHARP was designed as an interest reduction subsidy to bridge
the gap between cost based rent and attainable rent. The former is
defined as the rent needed to support the mortgage loan and
operating cost of a project while the latter is the maximum rent at
which units can be rented on the open market (in the case of units
reserved for low income households, the attainable rent will be no
higher than the published Section 8 Existing Fair Market Rents, with
allowance for a maximum amount trending rate of five percent).
Inherent in the SHARP program is the expectation that attainable
rents will grow more quickly over the term of the permanent
mortgage than cost-based rents as the later are closely tied to fixed
debt service payments. This hoped-for trend would allow both that
a project would become self-sustaining by its fifteenth year but also
that the minimum amount of necessary subsidy to ensure project
feasibility would decline during the term of the subsidy. In order to
maximize the SHARP subsidy and possibly increase the number of
low income units, developers are encouraged to combine SHARP with
other public/private resources.
The legislature appropriates SHARP disbursements for the
upcoming fiscal year and the state budget includes an authorization
for the SHARP program. The authorization establishes the maximum
annual contract authority which EOCD may commit to particular
SHARP projects. As SHARP funds are awarded before the
construction of a project and those subsidies are not expended until
construction is complete, the authorization provides a method
whereby the legislature can regulate the growth of the program in
future years.
SHARP funds are awarded at various competitive funding
rounds where developer proposals are reviewed against a set of
minimum standards and ranked accordingly. Since 1984 MHFA has
conducted four annual competitions for funding. The legislature has
authorized MHFA to enter into SHARP contracts for $38 million.
The SHARP subsidy has amounted to approximately $28.6
million and has yielded 83 developments totalling 9,456 units of
which 3,179 are low income units. MHFA's financing commitment to
these projects exceeds $785 million. Projected jobs and revenue
generated during construction and thirty years of operation include
8,317 construction jobs, private sector revenue of $1.23 billion and
public sector revenue of $228 million. 25 The Tax Reform Act of 1986
has made it more difficult to develop and syndicate rental housing,
yet the SHARP program remains competitive and continues to
address the need for additional rental units in Massachusetts.
The SHARP program was developed at a time when affordable
rental housing in general in Massachusetts was badly needed and all
forms of rental production needed to be encouraged. A tight rental
environment coupled with a healthy Massachusetts economy and
strong public and political support for SHARP provided a comfortable
foundation on which to launch and build the program.
However, times have changed since the inception of SHARP in
1983. As the Massachusetts Miracle has disappeared, the state has
experienced increased unemployment, contractions and layoffs in
core industries, and incurred a large deficit. All these broader
2 5 Annual Report, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Beyond Bricks and
Mortar, (June 30, 1989), p. 14.
economic changes might reasonably be expected to soften the
housing market. Sales are down significantly, some condo developers
are in default, but median prices have yet to decline. These are just
a few of the problems the State faces, and as a result the housing
market is different today. The cost of homeownership is down from
its high of over $180,000 a few years ago; it has stabilized but not
dropped below $170,000 and although the affordability gap has
stabilized it has not closed. According to all the developers and
agency officials I interviewed, the market rate rental side is much
softer and has witnessed added competition from the sagging
condominium market as developers are now renting the
condominiums for the short term to help offset carrying costs.
These changing market and state conditions obviously have
impacted the SHARP program. Their effect helps to illustrate the
strengths and weaknesses of SHARP, a matter to which I now turn.
Prior to discussing these traits it is important to mention and
understand the context in which SHARP has operated. Massachusetts
is very much an activist state regarding affordable and low income
housing and is considered by many observers and insiders as the
innovator in this regard. The concept of social responsibility runs
strongly in Massachusetts. Support for affordable housing appears to
be as strong today as it was in the "Miracle" days as indicated by a
recent Boston Globe survey of Massachusetts residents which
revealed that a significant majority of residents would pay more
taxes to assume that decent affordable housing be provided in
Massachusetts. 26  Moreover, such support has become more vocal
and received more attention recently when the issue of affordable
housing gained bipartisan support at the gubernatorial forum at
CHPA. As was seen, the political leadership certainly favors
affordability programs even in today's environment. Thus, as
illustrated support for programs such as SHARP is still intense.
The downturn in the real estate market is imposing costs on all
development - for instance, greater expenses and increased
turnover. SHARP developments might seem even more vulnerable,
given their initial tight financing and optimistic projects for
attainable rents. Yet, the SHARP program has fared extremely well
over the years and notwithstanding the soft market, it boasts a
stellar record. No foreclosures have occurred and most of the 83
SHARP developments have become self sustaining - that is they no
longer require continuing subsidies. Marvin Siflinger, Executive
Director of MHFA, noted that:
... the key advantage is that given certain
constraints, even in the best of times we have
2 6 The Boston Globe, Poll: "Mass voters back spending cuts, no new taxes,"
March 12, 1989.
limited resources as does the State.
been able to develop a program that provides
excellent housing for low and moderate
income people, particularly the low income
people. One of our strengths at MHFA is to be
supportive of mixed income housing and the
SHARP program fits very well with that
philosophy.
Many cultural constraints exist in our society and such a mixed
income approach involves both economic and racial integration.
However, a major advantage which Massachusetts enjoys is its
demonstrated experience with such developments. The success of
the Section 236 program, a rental assistance program supported by
the Federal Government in the 1970s, served as a base on which to
build the SHARP program. Mr. Siflinger commented:
The advantage we have in Massachusetts is
that we can alleviate a lot of fears by
showing the public how great looking these
developments are and how happy the current
residents are living in these developments.
You may be living next door to a 236 or a
SHARP development and you wouldn't know
it. It doesn't have any kind of a stigma. It
looks like decent conventional housing with
proper amenities.
Low and moderate income and market rate residents can live
together and enjoy a community experience if the development is
well managed. This has been a key to SHARP's success as experience
has been employed to manage diligently the portfolio. Josh Posner,
We've
Vice President of Development with The Community Builders, was
one of the many individuals who praised MHFA's management
ability. Providing low income housing has been a major concern in
Massachusetts and SHARP has responded very well to this challenge.
As previously mentioned SHARP has proved to be very successful
but its success is highlighted further by the people it has assisted.
MHFA recently completed an occupancy survey and average
household income of the SHARP occupied units was on average at or
below the median income in Massachusetts which was surprising
because many observers felt that SHARP would have hit a higher
than median income market. Such results further underscore
SHARP's track record.
Interviews with several housing experts at MHFA and EOCD, as
well as with many developers including Gene Kelly, Chairman of the
Developers Council (an organization comprised of seventy five
members), revealed that the greatest strength of SHARP had been its
flexibility. SHARP's ability to respond to the market place and adapt
to adverse market conditions appears to be a unique characteristic
that separates it from other programs. National rental production
programs such as the Section 236, Section 221D3, and Section 8 were
created in Washington without taking into consideration the diverse
economies in the various states. Such programs will either work or
prove unproductive depending on the creativity of state government
administrators and do not possess the flexibility that SHARP exhibits.
SHARP was the result of the collective experience in Massachusetts,
the mistakes of the aforementioned national programs, and an
understanding of the Massachusetts environment and was created to
be responsive to its particular needs. Robert Pyne, Director of
Development at MHFA, underscores the state specific aspect of
housing programs and recognizes that housing is a "trial and error
process." He stated the general sentiment of MHFA and the
development community:
SHARP has responded well and I am
delighted at the fact that given the market
downturn we can change the program to
respond to the market . . . that's the whole
point.
The flexibility of the program is evidenced by the number of
changes to the program over time. As previously discussed SHARP
funds are awarded on a competitive basis at funding rounds
according to MHFA and EOCD issued guidelines. Over the years these
guidelines have changed to reflect changes in policy, demand for low
income housing, and market conditions. For example, if the
attainable rent decreases or stabilizes in a softer market (instead of
increasing as originally anticipated), the program has been adapted
to continue to fill the gap and bring in more subsidy. A process was
devised which will authorize the state to provide additional subsidies
but, at the same time, will require developers to put more of their
profits back into the developments. Most recently, due to the
oversupply and availability of many market rate units, the program
guidelines have been altered to make SHARP a moderate and low
income program with a market rate component only where the
markets are still strong like in Cambridge and Newton. Yet, in other
softer Massachusetts' markets, the program was changed to increase
the per unit subsidy and focus on the need for moderate income
units. Some changes, as well, were made due to changes in tax law
particularly the tax reform act of 1986, while others were made in
response to the perceived need to increase the percentage of units
available to larger families, still other chances were more
administrative regarding the workings of the program. A major
change in round 4 was to require that the low income units be set
aside for low income households in perpetuity.
Real estate changes and state fiscal conditions in Massachusetts
have dampened development. As a result, there has not been a
SHARP funding round since 1987. Moreover, market factors and the
fiscal crisis have combined to create some SHARP portfolio concerns.
Although there have been no foreclosures to date, approximately
seven developments are experiencing financial difficulties in meeting
their debt service payments. The state had always viewed the
SHARP program as a declining fund commitment because as debt
service would be fixed, rents were expected to increase more than
enough to offset operating expenses, and the resultant increasing
cash flow would offset the declining SHARP subsidy. Some of these
developments now face problems, however, because cash flow has
not increased; rents have not risen as projected and operating
expenses were underbudgeted. Mr. Posner commented:
Historically rents have gone up, so it's not
unreasonable if you are trying to get as
much done as you can for the minimum
amount of dollars to think aggressively, act
aggressively, and count on rent increases. I
think it was probably pushed too far. If you
look historically over the last 30-40 years,
rents have gone up 5% a year. But that
doesn't mean there are not four to five years
that they do not go up at all. I think we are
in that kind of a time period now.
As can be seen, misjudging various key assumptions - market
decline coupled with a simultaneous weak state economy and budget
difficulties - can lead to troubling ~circumstances. Such a situation is
likely to arouse finger-pointing and calls by developers for the state
to intervene and provide the necessary funding to cover the
shortfalls. Mr. Kelly stated that:
Right from the beginning there was always
an understanding that flexibility in the
program would allow for changes in the
marketplace, changes in circumstances that
were beyond the developers control, and that
there would be additional funds there to
maneuver through whatever times that
confronted us. However, that was not the
way events occurred because the money that
was allocated in the state budget for SHARP
was based on the 15-year projections that
were being submitted. When MHFA and
EOCD were asked by the legislature 'how
much do you need, what is the absolute
minimum you need to make this thing work,'
they would go back to their fifteen year
schedules and see what they needed. They
never took into account unforeseen
circumstances of not being able to get 5% rent
increases every year, not being able to
achieve rent up of units as quickly, etc.
As illustrated a proper cushion was not implemented as part of the
process. Kelly added:
The real problem is the states inflexibility
and being able to add additional subsidy
when circumstances warranted. I don't think
anyone would have gone into the SHARP
program initially if they had ever thought
that the 15 year schedule they were putting
in was going to be set in stone. That's the
main problem.
Kelly stated that these comments reflected his viewpoint but also the
sentiments of many of the Council's members.
Another problem with SHARP developed as a result of its
inherent market rate characteristic. SHARP and other similar
schemes formulated during the tight rental markets of the 1980s
tried to subsidize affordable housing not with government funds but
with the market rate component of the development. Such a
program operates well in a tight environment but when the market
peaks and softens problems begin to emerge as one may not rent up
as projections are not met and revenues fall short of projections.
There needs to be some financial flexibility in the program. Yet, as
Kelly aptly noted, "the state doesn't have the money to be flexible."
The Legislature has authorized MHFA in 1990 to enter into
contracts of $38 million. The agency has contracted approximately
$28 million, and MHFA is requesting an additional $10 million to
cover existing troubled developments. Given popular support for
affordable housing and the lobbying efforts of housing proponents,
the chances of receiving funding are not as bleak as one might first
think. Yet, the possibility that funds will not be appropriated is a
serious concern that housing advocates must face. In the interim,
developers have been required to take responsibility for their
particular situation - funding operating deficits with their own
resources, including letters of credit. Developers must fulfill letters
of credit requirements which are guaranteed for operations in order
to close projects. Originally the amount required was four percent of
the mortgage but it has increased to six percent. Kelly explained the
scenario:
The developer has to make the decision as to
whether they are going into default and have
the letter of credit called or whether they are
going to print some of their own cash and
thinking it's going to make it work out. But
once the letter of credit is gone then there is
no other source of funds for the project other
than going back to the limited partners or
going back to the general partner and saying
'we are going to foreclose here and you are
going to face recapture of all of your tax
deductions and it's going to be very
expensive for you. You would be better off
putting some more cash into the deal and
make it work.
Developer complaints stem primarily from this issue of responsibility
as it has created considerable debate.
These developer responsibilities and liabilities, the banking
contraction in the area, and uncertain demand for product pose a
risky environment for development. Presently, asset management is
the prime concern of most developers. Kelly believed that the only
people who would consider engaging in a project would be those
...who already own land or are involved in
the second stage of a project or part of a
development that's already finished so they
already have a substantial investment in
place... but other than that there is no reason.
The impact of the housing market and state fiscal condition on
the SHARP program has been damaging. Kelly explained:
The whole concept isn't working anymore
because part of it is that the program was
driven in large part by demand, subsidy, and
the syndication market. Supply has out-
stripped demand, subsidy resources are in
jeopardy given the state's fiscal mess, and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, when it went into
effect basically in 1987, substantially
changed the value of syndication due to the
passive loss rules, etc., and so it became less
worthwhile to do these deals. All these
factors combined have hurt and basically we
had a program that worked fine while
inflation was going on and rents were
increasing, but it isn't working now due to
the factors that I already mentioned.
He added:
Housing programs have a life and they sort of
fade as times change and new ones are
developed with new concepts, ideas, sources.
This point is further underscored by the political realty of an
election year. There will be a new governor at the beginning of the
year and more than likely he/she will want to establish housing
policy and programs with his/her imprint. Uncertainty is a crucial
factor as Kelly notes that "...you are going to have different people
involved and the whole face of the business changes because you
don't know who is going to be around in a couple of years."
Kelly and other developers believe that the SHARP program
has run its course and that more moderate income units must be
targeted as market rate units saturate the market. This criticism has
been addressed and SHARP has responded by providing for such a
new orientation in its next round as a programmatic change has been
made from a production focus to an affordability focus. Yet, as Kelly
noted, today's changed environment and the uncertainty associated
with it do not spur enthusiasm for new development especially when
a new untested program is concerned.
Not surprisingly, profit issues are concerns of all the parties
involved. MHFA has defined reasonable profit as 10 percent of
project costs, but developers feel that 15 percent is more
appropriate. Siflinger commented:
It's our job to give them a profit that will
entice them into the program but to make
sure that the profits are not abusive as they
were in some federal programs. If profits are
abusive then we'll find that the
Massachusetts taxpayer will turn off and will
not be supportive of the program and their
support we cannot afford to lose.
Siflinger's view is characteristic of agency officials not only in
Massachusetts but in Rhode Island and Maryland as well. Debate
over profits will continue as it is a contentious issue.
As indicated the main criticism of SHARP surrounds the issue
of flexibility. Developers complain that the $10 million has not been
made available to them fast, yet it is MHFA's strategy to ensure that
projects actually needed assistance. As Pyne explained:
We are not in the business of bailing out
developers who have mismanaged their
developments, and through our management
function we can objectively determine the
management job that developers are doing.
If they do a poor job, then they must bear
the cost of mismanagement. If developments
are found to be in need it is also part of our
strategy that developers share the pain. It
should not only be a burden to the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to pay for
project shortfalls, but if developers were
making reasonable profits then they ought to
put them back in. So we spent a long time in
developing program guidelines and
negotiating those guidelines with the
developers.
Diligent reviewing standards and policies cannot be faulted but state
budgetary woes have obviously encumbered the program and
negatively impacted its flexibility. When asked if there were any
measures which could be implemented to safeguard SHARP from
such dilemmas, Siflinger responded:
I don't think so. I think it is proper that
programs go through an appropriation
process or a decision making process that
compares the value of these programs with
other Massachusetts programs - education,
health, other services, so that our political
leaders can make a judgment about what our
priorities are. It's a healthy process and I
think that when we think of expanding our
housing programs, they must run the
gauntlet of restrictive resources and a very
healthy political decision making process.
CHAPTER III
Rhode Island's Rental Production Program
Similar affordability problems have been witnessed across the
country including Rhode Island. Changing demographics and a real
estate boom coupled with reduction in federal funds for producing
affordable housing have place great pressure on the low end of the
rental housing market. Many low end units disappeared through
upgrading and condominium conversion while the number of
potential renters was rapidly increasing due to similar forces of the
Massachusetts experience, i.e. increasing homeownership costs, larger
affordability gaps, new household formation.
Although the population of Rhode Island has remained
relatively stable, there has been a dramatic net increase in the
number of households mainly due to changes in the composition of
families and increases in individuals living alone, which has created a
major housing crunch. From 1980 to 1985, the number of
households increased by 30,015 with three groups exhibiting
relatively low historical rates of homeownership growing rapidly,
namely families headed by single parents, households composed of
unrelated individuals and persons living alone. The largest increase
in households amounting to 25,042 occurred in the single parent and
nonfamily household groups where 70 percent of the households
rent. 27  Another characteristic of the times was the "baby boom"
generation reached home buying age. In fact, the population of
residents between the age of 25 and 39 (prime home buying years)
rose 42 percent since 1975.28 The size of this age group is expected
to continue to be high well into the 1990s and then steadily decline
until about 2010.
The housing industry grew strongly during this period but its
response has been insufficient as evidenced by the fact that only
approximately 18,000 housing units have been added since 1980 to
serve the additional 30,015 households formed during this same
period. 2 9  Increased demand for homeownership by baby boomers,
falling interest rates, rising inflation, and the changing notion that
the house was no longer just a home but an investment increased the
number of sales statewide and sent home purchase prices upward.
The average purchase price statewide in 1981 was $56,315 and in
1984 was $63,875 but 1989 it rose to $140,878.30 Also the
affordability gap has increased over the years adding to housing
2 7 Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation, Summary:
Housing Needs and Market in Rhode Island, (March, 1988), p. 1.
28 Ibid., p. 2.
29 Ibid., p. 2.
3 0 Rhode Island Housing Department of Policy and Program Development,
Housing in Rhode Island, 1989 Summary Statistics, 1989, p. 17.
concerns. In the 1950s a typical thirty year old person spent
approximately 14 percent of their paycheck on house payments. By
the 1970s the required share of income rose to 21 percent and by
1985 it increased to 44 percent. By 1989 the income required to
purchase an average priced home was $53,965 as compared to the
median income of $36,700.31
The high demand for single family homes pushed up land
prices, profit and overhead in comparison to other costs. Even
though production of single family housing in the state has somewhat
matched demand in regard to numbers, such escalating prices have
resulted in declining rates of homeownership. As a further
illustration, from 1980 to 1982 income gains matched gains in home
prices. Since 1984 income in Rhode Island increased 10.5 percent,
yet housing prices rose 59.2% in the same period. 3 2
Furthermore, the rental shortage caused rents to increase
substantially and enhanced the attractiveness of real estate as an
investment resulting in rapid turnover of properties and a reduction
in owner occupancy. Statewide sales of multi-unit properties more
than doubled between 1980 and 1985. By 1986 less than one third
31Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation, Summary:
Housing Needs and Market in Rhode Island, (March, 1988), p. 2.
3 2Ibid, (March, 1988), p. 3.
of multi-family homes in the state had an owner occupant. Such
trends continued and rents rose as new investors demanded market
returns. In 1980 the average rent was $161 per month; by 1986 it
had increased to $454, a $181 percent increase; and by 1988 to $591
per month. 3 3
These rental increases have most seriously impacted low and
moderate income households and single person households. In many
communities over 50 percent of renter households cannot afford the
average apartment. Also, it has been estimated that 20% of Rhode
Island households spend more than 35 percent of their income on
rent. Waiting lists for public assisted housing increased and the state
is faced with losing approximately 4,200 units as a result of the
expiring use situation.
The result of these conditions has been a serious shortage of
affordable family rental housing. Simultaneously, the cost of
producing new units is prohibitive to low income households. Due to
the critical need for affordable family rental housing, the program
emphasizes production of these units. All the units built in this
funding cycle have been built for family households with incomes
below 60 percent of median, and many serve households with
incomes as low as 30 percent of median. The Rhode Island Housing
3 3 Ibid., p. 3.
and Mortgage Finance Corporation realized the need to concentrate
its efforts on low income family housing just as the federal
government began its cutbacks in production funding. This high cost,
limited resource environment spurred the development of the Rental
Production Program (RPP).
Various elements from the RPP guidelines were selected to
provide an outline of the program. The Program instituted in 1987 is
a multi-faceted approach to rental housing development which
purports the following strategy: to reduce hard and soft costs
wherever possible, find as much equity as possible, discover
operating subsidies when available, and then employ limited
Corporation resources to fill the gap. To address the gap through
financing, the Corporation established the Targeted Loan Fund (TLF)
which offered deferred second mortgages of up to $30,000/unit at
zero percent interest. Thus, agency reserves are used to write down
the development cost of low income housing developments. Housing
sponsors may submit a proposal to use these funds as either an up-
front capital contribution, or as an annual income subsidy similar to
the SHARP program in Massachusetts. First mortgage financing from
Rhode Island Housing is provided through the sale of tax exempt or
taxable bonds. Yet, the size of the gap and the limited resources
available for the TLF prompted the Corporation to seek further
financing options. In order to maximize the advantage provided by
the federal low income housing tax credits, a requirement has been
stipulated that syndication proceeds must be retained as equity and
not withdrawn and treated as a developer's fee. Also the state
approved a Rental Subsidy Program in June of 1988 whereby funds
would be available for up to 20 years to provide rental assistance to
housing developments statewide. Thus, the combination of first
mortgage, second mortgage, development based rental subsidies and
equity raised through the sale of low income tax credits can be
employed for development efforts.
The Corporation in order to reduce transaction costs has also
instituted three major initiatives, namely the Equity Pool, the State
Pension Fund, and the Lawyers Clearinghouse. The Equity Fund is an
important public/private venture which has provided a method for
reducing the transaction costs of converting tax credits into equity.
The Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation
established a subsidiary, the Rhode Island Equity Corporation to
become General Partner in a limited partnership with the Rhode
Island Housing Equity Pool. The limited partners are Rhode Island
corporations which not only participate in producing affordable
housing but also enjoy substantial tax and investment benefits. Also
the State recognizing the need for operating subsidies to make rental
housing more affordable established a one time rental subsidy
program in 1988 through the General Assembly which allocates $5
million per year for twenty years. The Rental Subsidy Program in
order to ensure the viability of new rental units gives priority to new
units produced through the Rental Production Program.
Another way to reduce costs was through the provision of a
secure source of purchasers for the bonds backing developments.
The Corporation reached an agreement with the State Investment
Commission to purchase up to $15 million in taxable bonds on very
favorable terms. The purchase agreement provides a substantial
savings in interest rates, marketing costs, and reduces uncertainty
for housing sponsors. Due to the presence and involvement of so
many non-profit developers, an effort was initiated to aid in
reducing soft costs. The Rhode Island Lawyers Clearinghouse for
Affordable Housing was created to provide free legal advice to serve
both the development and corporate needs of non profits.
The Rhode Island Rental Production Program has enjoyed
success from its inception in 1987 when request for proposals were
issued and only eight responses were initially received. The
environment then, however, was different as James Beachler,
Executive Director of Rhode Island Housing Finance Corporation
explained:
Tax credit programs in 1987 were ones
where very few developers knew anything
about it. It was a time of restructuring
programs to accommodate the different
resources that were available. The develop-
ment community did not understand the
workings of the program and its been a
learning process. Also many developers were
building condos and commercial strips that
were sprouting up throughout the region at
that point in time. So there were very few
developers interested in housing.
Yet, in 1988 the Corporation received 30 proposals and the
most recent request for proposal ended with 35 responses. The
Program has provided 742 units primarily low income and has
invested $30 million. To date there have been no foreclosures or
financial difficulties with the properties. As mentioned there are
many aspects to the overall program and many aspects work in
tandem to produce the desired product. Unlike in Massachusetts
where a clear distinction is made between, for example, the SHARP
program and the TELLER (tax exempt bond) program, Rhode Island
Housing does not delineate carefully the contributions of each phase
of the overall program.
Furthermore, the unique history of the Rhode Island Housing
Finance Corporation has greatly contributed to the formulation and
direction of the program. The Section 8 program was still operating
in the late 1970s and for the most part continued until
approximately 1980 when it was effectively cancelled by the Reagan
Administration. Developments were still being produced under the
auspices of the program for about the next two or three years and
then from a pipeline standpoint ceased. No rental subsidies were
available for developments except for those that were built through
the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program.
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a tax credit program
was created as a three year program from 1987 to 1989 and has
received a one year extension for 1990. In 1984 the Corporation
underwent a scandal as the first and only executive director for
twelve years misappropriated funds and was removed in 1985. This
event proved to be a major embarrassment, obstacle and setback for
the Corporation. In light of these developments, in 1986 the charge
of the Corporation was to develop new programs that met the new
era and in 1987 the Rental Production Program was instituted.
Emphasis on low and moderate income developments
continued to be the direction of Rhode Island housing policy with
only a few mixed income developments initiated to date. Only low
and moderate income units receive targeted loan funds. Non-profits
have tended to be the major participants in the program for several
reasons, namely: the apprehension on the part of the Corporation to
engage in activities with for profit developers and the negative
connotations of this group directly after the scandal; the complexity
of the program from a developer's perspective regarding rules and
guidelines and the associated learning curve experience; the fact that
many for profit developers were involved in the development of
market rate units, condominiums, commercial ventures, etc., and
concentrated their efforts in these pursuits and markets with which
they were familiar; and profit margins tend to be low, approximately
10%, with limited upside potential.
A major characteristic and strength of the Rental Production
Program is rooted in the history of the Corporation's endeavors in
that it has accumulated significant reserves from being quite active
in the Section 8 program. Targeted loan funds are provided by the
Corporation's reserves as opposed to the legislature appropriating
funds as is the case in many states. In the previous era, a group
within Rhode Island Housing dealt almost exclusively with
developing primarily elderly developments in non-urban areas and
charged healthy fees for services rendered. The projects which were
undertaken were not risky developments and as a result over the
years excessive profits were accumulated.
Having profited from the bond issues the Corporation's Board
was one of the first boards in the country to make a decision to
extend some of the accumulated reserves for housing. From both the
state's, Corporation's, and developer's perspectives this unique set of
circumstances is most advantageous. The State is presently
encountering a deficit of approximately $100 million and if were not
for the Corporation's excess reserves, rental production for low and
moderate income households would be at a standstill. In fact, the
newly created rental subsidy program whereby the state provides
funds for rental assistance for up to 20 years, has in fact been
funded from the Corporation's reserves for the past two years. These
funds will not be repaid.
Given the budget deficit, the legislature is quite happy to see
the program develop in this way and is afforded the luxury of a
reserve funding source for its rental subsidy program. Ross Dagata,
Executive Director of the Rhode Island Builders Association, spoke for
his membership and noted:
The legislature seems to treat Rhode Island
Housing fairly quickly in the process as if it
were an extension of the state budget so the
upshot of all this is that the Rhode Island
housing's semi-independent funds are used
in the same way basically by the legislature.
So the legislature gets away with not funding
affordable housing, yet the likely result of
insisting that the funds come from Rhode
Island Housing is that not very many funds
will come. They can maybe afford to do a
certain amount of up front one time subsidies
but they can't afford to take on within their
budget 15 year contracts for rent subsidy.
They certainly can't do both. They have
accumulated a lot of excess profits over the
years but it's not an unlimited amount, so it
has constrained rental production to some
extent due to the limits of the funding source.
These comments were in accordance with and generally accepted by
the developers I interviewed. These developers felt their views
were representative of the development community regarding this
subject.
Nevertheless, the ability of the Corporation to fill the gap when
the state experienced fiscal problems is a major benefit. The
Corporation enjoys this power in that it is not dependent on the
legislature to appropriate funds to the program and is not as subject
to state budgetary concerns. The developer gains security with such
an arrangement for he knows that funds are available even in a poor
state fiscal environment.
The comprehensive approach and focus of the Program serves
as another strength. Mr. Beachler echoed this view:
We as an agency incorporate all facets of the
development process under one roof. We
have a pretty thorough program with the
first and second mortgage financing, tax
credits and over the past year we have
subsidy funding for the low income units.
Also, by having focused on the development of low income units
which have enjoyed rental assistance market sensitivity is not a
factor and rental income is more solid than in developments with a
market rate component which can be volatile and affect the
performance of the entire development.
Also, the program has adopted to meet changing circumstances
and developer needs as Posner described:
More recently as we have tried to do more
difficult developments and Rhode Island
Housing has reduced the size of the targeted
loan fund, we have taken the upfront money
and created an annuity and turned it into a
declining amount of funds that comes into the
development overtime based on 5 percent
rent increases. We do this is conjunction with
Rhode Island Housing. We put the annuity
with them and they provide the funds
monthly but supposedly it's been funded up
front.
This practice is common for many developers. The targeted loan
fund provides second mortgages two different ways: a lump sum
which offers the benefits of a lower mortgage, principal and interest
payments; and an operating subsidy format where funds are
expended over time. A cushion is provided as rents are projected to
increase at such a rate, 5 percent, to more than offset operating
expense increases and constant debt service payments resulting in a
net gain. From that net gain the targeted loan funds are expected to
be repaid, but such repayment can be deferred or forgiven if
justified.
It is important to note that given the size of the program and
the number of units produced, support for affordable housing is
strong. Although the legislature acts like it is sticking the
Corporation with the bill it is behind this effort and is temporarily
handcuffed by the state's fiscal situation. The governor and mayors
are advocates of this cause and all lend it support.
In addition to some of the apparent advantages of the program,
the developers that I interviewed voiced specific concerns about the
program. The issues of profit margins and lowered loan amounts
over the years was a common complaint. Ross Dagata stated:
They've been juggling around how big that
program is mostly to make sure it is the
smallest amount it can be and still get the job
done. So the value has declined dramatically
over the last couple of years. When it first
started it was much more and provided
$30,000 per low income unit, and now it's
about $18,000.
Production of rental units was another concern of many developers.
Mr. Dagata believed that the program overemphasized the
involvement of non-profits yet feels more attention should be given
to working cooperatively in conjunction with them to produce more
work for developers and a better quality product.
As far as the management of the Program is concerned, it has
made an admirable comeback though as it was only recently
instituted, it still appears to be in its formative years.
commented:
There is an unrealistic view on the part of the
agency on how much it costs to build good
quality affordable housing. So, as they come
to believe that they can do more with less,
they cut their own rules and budgets.
He continued:
Rhode Island's unique history and limited
experience in affordable housing production
has resulted in less flexibility and a
somewhat adversarial approach to funding.
The state/ developer relationship is not as
helpful as it could be, but I think that will
come with experience and more construction
units under the belts of the development
community.
These views concurred with the attitude of many of the developers
surveyed.
Having one agency, the Corporation, providing practically the
full range of services provokes some concern amongst developers as
Posner explained:
I have a real problem with some of the
different hats that Rhode Island Housing is
wearing, as they are wearing a lot of them,
that is, the subsidy provider, mortgage
lender, equity source, as the lawyer in some
cases through the clearinghouse they have a
development company where they will be
the developer. It gets a little incestuous and
I feel that such centralization can lead to an
Posner
unbalanced industry. I think there are
different roles, different pieces that the real
estate industry has and they are valuable.
Centralizing it can make it difficult for non-
profit community groups to deal with
because basically they are subservient to one
agency instead of being the key actor that
balances out competing interests from
investors and lenders to subsidy sources.
There is much more potential for them to be
treated as non-essential players and I think
that is extremely unhealthy.
The centralized position of the Corporation was a general concern of
many developers, particularly the non-profits.
CHAPTER IV
Maryland's Rental Housing Production Program
Maryland has also encountered housing affordability problems.
In 1989 the Maryland Housing Commission reported that
approximately 285,000 renter households were paying more than 35
percent of their income for rent. Currently, Maryland's strong
economy has meant continued upward pressure on home prices in
the short term, further decreasing the opportunity for many families
to move up to homeownership. Home prices have increased steadily
over the years as average home prices statewide rose from $97,039
in 1987 to $112,475 in 1988 and by 1989 were bordering
$130,000.34 Specific data regarding the income required to purchase
an average priced home and median income was difficult to obtain,
but interviews with agency officials indicated that the gap was
widening. Rental information also was scarce and impressionistic,
but the rental market was described as being tight, particularly at
the low end of the market with the market rate units exhibiting
some softness. The excess demand at the low end of the market may
be further exacerbated, as reports indicate that by 1992 as many as
32,000 federally subsidized units in the state could be in danger of
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converting to market-rate housing or to condominium units if the
owners pre-pay their mortgages or end their federal assistance
agreements. Even though the federal government imposed a
moratorium on such concerns in 1987, that action is only temporary
and does not provide a final solution.
Assessing the Maryland housing market, Christopher Tawa,
Administrator of Housing Finance at the Community Development
Administration (CDA), the state's housing finance agency, stated:
Here you have a strong market driven partly
by the fact that we're so close to D.C. Also the
federal government is said to be recession
proof and because of its strong employment
base and the fact that it doesn't really
contract, there is not as much soft market
activity. There is a bit of overbuilding in the
rental market rate but it is not the same
given the concentration of our program on
low income households. On the
homeownership side the Maryland market is
strong and has had a pretty strong
appreciation but that is more of an
appreciation based on about 5 to 8 percent
per year, maybe 10 percent. Also a big factor
was we had very steady growth that closely
equated with the population growth. So you
had projects that were being created at, in
parallel with, the increase in the population
increase.
These factors, together with the strong state economy, have made for
a favorable environment regarding low income production.
CDA has attempted to alleviate the affordability problem by
creating a variety of homeownership and rental programs.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s CDA coupled multi-family tax
exempt financing with federal subsidy programs such as Section 236,
an interest subsidy program, and Section 8, a rent subsidy program.
Since 1982 CDA has financed market rate multi-family developments
with tax exempt bonds, and in 1986 it expanded its rental programs
to include state general fund financing programs to serve very low
income renter households.
The Rental Housing Production Program (RHPP) was part of
that package and was designed to increase the supply of rental
housing for low income families. The program provides below
market rate and deferred payment loans to developers. Loan terms
are structured to help make the development viable and affordable
and may range from 15 to 30 years with flexible interest rates and
deferred payments of principal or interest or both. The amount of
any one loan is capped at $1 million. Funds may be used for
acquisition, construction, rehabilitation and development costs, i.e.
market studies, appraisals, legal and architectural and engineering
fees, and other costs directly related to the development of housing
as well as to subsidize the operating costs of newly constructed or
rehabilitated housing. Eligible resident households must have annual
income of 60 percent of the area median income or less, adjusted for
family size. Priority is given to developments which serve the
greatest number of families with income below 30 percent of area
median income. Local government involvement is also witnessed as
the local jurisdiction, in which a rental housing development financed
through the program is located, must approve the development and
make a contribution which significantly reduces the project's
development or operating costs, or otherwise materially support the
development. Cries of "not in my backyard" can pose roadblocks to
developments. To date these objections have not presented a
problem but Tawa observed that in the future they could pose
obstacles. Under RHPP $22.6 million in funding has been used to
produce 1,246 units. The program has received the largest budget
allocation of any of the state funded programs and has experienced
increases in funding from $9 million in 1987 to $12.5 million in
1990.35
Although RHPP has only a brief history many of the agency
officials and developers I surveyed were quite pleased with the
program, and viewed CDA as a very experienced agency with a
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skilled and knowledgeable staff. For example, Marilyn Ducker, Vice
President of Shelter Corporation in Baltimore, commented:
CDA will permit its funds to be the first
money into the deal. But they will go in
ahead of, for example, the first mortgage
construction lender. That's another strength
of the program in that they'll put their
money up early and since you are not paying
any interest at all during the construction
period normally, interest doesn't usually start
accruing until you're in an operating phase.
That's a tremendous advantage to your
project because you're not loading it up front
with the big interest costs from a private
debt source that's at a prime based interest
rate.
Other developers also concurred that the capital cost subsidy
approach of the program was effective, defraying up-front costs.
Also, the funds are nonrecourse debt; so if the project performed
terribly, experienced poor appreciation and then one went to sell it
after 20 years, having paid off the first mortgage and one's investors,
one is not obligated to repay the loan if funds are not available.
From CDA's point of view, certain monitoring protections were built
into the document so if the developer was not performing CDA can
insist on new management or other necessary changes.
When markets are soft, vacancies are high, the amount of
revenue is less than expected, a project encounters distress and
unless an operating subsidy is an available alternative a workout
According to Valerie Montague, Assistant to the
Director of the Office of Research and Information Systems at CDA, if
developers were still obligated to make payments to CDA, the agency
"can defer payments, we can suspend those payments on the debt
service side, we can refinance the project and deliver a lower rate of
interest to the project." Yet such market conditions do not appear to
affect directly the focus of RHPP. As Tawa explained:
Obviously it's our view that the demand for
housing that is affordable far exceeds the
supply and probably always will. So that
when you create units for person at 60
percent of median income or less and charge
them rents based on 30 percent of their
income, that means that you've driven your
rent down to a level that's pretty low in
comparison to the market. It's our feeling
that if the project is of good quality, a decent
product, then there ought to always be a very
strong demand for that housing because even
in a soft market you can still be producing
units that are less expensive to low income
persons. So I think the market for these
units tends to be quite strong even in a soft
market.
An additional strength of RHPP was identified explicitly by all
the individuals I interviewed: the program is flexible in regard to
terms, rates, and ability to adapt to changing developer needs. James
Ginsburg, President of the Waterford Group, a development company
in Montgomery County, commented:
situation arises.
Flexibility is a big attraction of the program.
The fact that the money is extremely flexible
- it's the hardest working money when you
can get the cash flow mortgage and can use
the different ways of extremely flexible
source of funds. For example, you can take a
third mortgage, you can take a 30 year term,
you can have no payments on a loan for the
first 5 years. [The program] can do flexible
terms as well as interest rates.
The concept behind this flexibility is to work with the developer to
make the project work. Discussion and negotiation characterize the
process.
Allowable profit margins of up to 15 percent were encouraging
to many developers, and strong state support for affordable housing
programs underscored developers confidence in the program. In
fact, this past year the legislature passed the largest state funded
overall housing budget to date, $50 million.
There was much enthusiasm from the development community
regarding CDA efforts and RHPP specifically, yet developers and CDA
officials did have some concerns. The main complaint from both
groups was that more money was needed to supply more units. The
form and timing of the funds was also a concern. Tawa explained:
Maryland does not have any state funded
operating subsidy program. We have no
rental assistance program that we fund
directly. That means all the business we do
in Maryland in terms of affordable housing is
done by providing discounted capital. Now
that means because we write down the cost
of capital instead of providing an operating
subsidy, ours is not as flexible a subsidy.
If, for instance, revenues did not provide the expected buffer with
respect to expenses and debt service, then there was no cushion
available.
Also, the maximum loan cap of $1 million was seen to present a
problem for larger projects, as the per unit subsidy decreases and
with it the defraying of capital costs. Although CDA may waive the
limit and some developers have received waivers, the process
involved is very involved and time consuming. In fact, CDA does not
like and even discourages one from pursuing this option. Limited
funds and political realities impact this process in any event. Daniel
Henson of Struever Brothers, Eccles & Ross, a development firm in the
Baltimore area, elaborated on this well accepted point:
Politics plays a role, because if you have a
limited amount of funds that's sort of the
easiest way to make sure that lots of
different people benefit from it rather than a
couple of large projects in select areas. This
way I think they feel they can help more
jurisdictions and get more political bang for
the buck.
Not only was the programmatic design an effort to spread the
wealth and benefits across the state, but also it considered the
political environment. Tawa explained:
... to purchase an offering and subsidy
program means that every year the state
legislature has to appropriate funds and come
up to the bar to put more money into the
program. Here in Maryland it's a one shot
deal where you make the capital loan and
you don't have to put any more money into
the project you've done it. It's not repeatable
each year providing funding for a project.
The basic funding approach of the program and statements of the
interviewees leave the impression that state support is strong yet
conservative. The future for such programs and accompanied
funding is not entirely certain. Local government approval and
funding support have not presented major obstacles to date, but
there exists the concern among CDA officials that lack of appropriate
measures to ensure proportionate responsibility for affordable
housing could isolate low income communities or thwart further
efforts. As Tawa stated:
State and local governments need to develop
and promote model zoning provisions
assuring affordable housing. After an initial
implementation period, the state needs to
target resources to political subdivisions that
either zone for affordable housing or take
other actions to create or retain affordable
housing.
The Community Assistance Administration, Maryland's compre-
hensive community development agency has begun work on such a
zoning package.
The only other complaint voiced was the apparent insufficiency
of CDA staff. In fact, according to Marilyn Ducker, the only negative
press the program has received was that they did not spend all of
their budgeted allotment last year. The reason for this appears to be
a lengthy bureaucratic process which has frustrated many
developers. Yet all factors considered, the program enjoys success
and support.
CHAPTER V
Comparative Analysis
Having outlined the three states' housing markets, economic
situations, and rental initiatives, I will now analyze the significant
similarities and differences among the programs, with a particular
eye toward judging the success of the programs and identifying
lessons and recommendations for other states less experienced in
promoting affordable housing. General impressions may provide
some insight when judging the success of state housing programs, but
for a more appropriate and meaningful gauge I needed to scrutinize
the programs with the aid of certain criteria: number of units
produced, a definitional orientation emphasizing realization of intent,
cost effectiveness, robustness - the ability to adapt to changing
market and political factors - and state support.
As stated earlier, each state possesses its own unique set of
circumstances, political realities, market conditions and forces, fiscal
and budgetary issues, history and tradition, all of which shape the
way it approaches certain issues. Housing is no exception. The
SHARP program in Massachusetts, instituted in 1983, served as a
shallow operating subsidy and enjoys a longer history than the
Rental Production Program (RPP) in Rhode Island and the Rental
Housing Production Program (RHPP) in Maryland (both of which
were both designed in 1986). That longer experience has proven
extremely valuable for as Siflinger mentioned, "We tend to do things
on a trial and error basis. We learn from our mistakes and the
mistakes of others."
Nonetheless, all of these states have the reputation of currently
being activist in regard to affordable housing. Maryland received
praise from its development community and other housing finance
agencies; Rhode Island recently received an award in 1989 for the
best overall Rental Production Program; and Massachusetts has been
heralded for years as the innovator concerning state housing
programs.
Units Produced
Popular accolades aside, it is now necessary to enlist the
success criteria. Guidance was needed and Massachusetts and a few
other states provided the housing finance agencies and creativity
which led the way through the uncertain environment created by the
Reagan Administration cutbacks and the 1980s. Production is one
obvious test of success. The SHARP Program track record speaks for
itself. SHARP was responsible for the development of 9,456 units
including market rate, from 1983 to present. Today, however,
SHARP's future is less certain, due to state budgetary problems.
Rhode Island's overall Rental Production Program in the last few
years has produced 742 units. It is important to remember that the
Corporation employs an integrated approach to housing production
regarding the various tools and devices at its disposal, first mortgage
finance, the targeted loan fund (second mortgage), tax credits, etc.
Thus, it was difficult to ascertain which specific aspects of the overall
program were responsible for what developments as oftentimes
many resources were used in conjunction. The targeted loan fund
(the zero interest loan which can be taken as a lump sum or arranged
as a declining operating subsidy like SHARP) was the piece of the
overall program on which I concentrated. According to Beachler, it
was responsible for approximately 30 percent of the developments
or 222 units. In turn, the first mortgage and tax credit program each
comprised approximately 35 percent. Although Rhode Island also
encountered deficit problems, it will continue to increase its
production of affordable housing due to its unique funding source,
the Corporation's reserves.
Maryland's RHPP as capital cost subsidy has been effective in
assisting the production of affordable housing and has aided 1,246
units. The budget for next year allows for the same amount of funds
to be allocated to RHPP as this year, namely $12.5 million. As seen
each program has made a strong effort regarding rental production
for not only affordable housing but also low income housing.
Realizing Intent
These three state programs made a measurable impact during
the time they have been in service, yet it is important to note that
each faced different origins, environments, and challenges. Times
and circumstances changed considerably since these programs'
inceptions and have affected some more than others. Pursuing and
achieving the stipulated intent and desired result of a program
constitutes a more formal definition of success. The SHARP program
was developed and implemented at a time when the state economy
was entering a period of tremendous growth in Massachusetts and
the great need was for rental production of all kinds. In response, a
mixed income approach was adopted which would produce 75
percent market rate units and a 25 percent low income component.
This design decision was based on the need to spur overall rental
production in an aggressive manner. SHARP fared well and
succeeded in increasing the supply of well designed affordable,
marketable units through most of the 1980s.
When the economy and housing market began to soften in the
late 1980s, however, SHARP encountered difficulties as rental
revenues were not meeting projections and expenses increased at
higher than expected rates resulting in operating deficits for several
projects. SHARP relied on a market rate component to subsidize the
project unlike Rhode Island's program and Maryland's RHPP. Such a
program can be a double edged sword if market conditions are not
properly monitored and factored into policy decisions. All was well
until the market became overbuilt and softened, leaving SHARP in
the unenviable position of being faced with a dual threat, i.e., a soft
market and a state budget deficit. Yet, Sharp succeeded in fulfilling
the intent of its design by greatly facilitating the production of rental
housing.
Rhode Island and Maryland both adopted programs which
would serve low income households and which would benefit those
with the greatest need. These two states' housing market
circumstances were different than the Massachusetts experience
with the development of SHARP in that although there was a
tremendous need for low income housing, there was not as great a
demand for market rate rental production. This aspect of the
housing environment permitted a more selected focus. The history
and tradition of the housing finance agencies, particularly the Rhode
Island scandal, and subsequent aversion to the developer's profit
orientation, as well as the philosophies of certain key agency officials
also were factors leading to a low income and nonprofit
concentration. The program design decision to target funds to low
income families stemmed from a resource allocation issue based on
cost benefit analysis.
Both housing finance agencies wanted to maximize resources
and felt that subsidizing market rate units as done in the SHARP
mixed income approach was not appropriate and efficient given their
objectives and housing market conditions. Both agencies stated that
their resources would only be used to assist low income units. With
this targeted approach one does not have the advantage of the
upside of the market rate side of a mixed income development, yet,
the downside is limited and some policy makers believe if a project
is well designed and managed then there is no market downside.
Rental information in all three states was very difficult to
obtain as was a gauge on the demand for low income housing.
Specific figures could not be obtained and the data I received was
anecdotal and impressionistic. The general sentiment was voiced by
one agency official:
We know there is a great demand for low
income housing such that the demand will
almost always exceed the supply. We know
the demand is there so we feel no compelling
reason at this point to specifically quantify a
demand which we know is overwhelming.
Thus, the argument continues that there is always a strong demand
for low income housing and so a program with this orientation is
much less susceptible to a soft market as the rental income is
basically more solid. RPP and RHPP also have been true to their
intent by aggressively producing low income housing.
Cost Effectiveness
Given the scarcity of state resources, cost effectiveness is a
major concern and serves as another test of success. The SHARP
program subsidizes not only the low income units but also the
market rate units which leads one to question whether funds are
being wasted. Would not funds be better spent on all low income
units thereby assisting many more low income people? This issue
was carefully deliberated in the design stage and the mixed income
approach was adopted for a host of reasons, including housing needs
at the time, marketability and developer pressures. Even though the
market rate units are subsidized they serve to cross-subsidize the
development, thereby potentially offsetting the subsidy. It should
be noted that SHARP has assisted in producing over 2,800 units of
low income housing. Also mixed income developments can enjoy a
political advantage in that they tend to be more accepted by the
locality in which they are located than one hundred percent low
income developments.
Moreover, cost effectiveness is intertwined with the intent of
the program. At the time of SHARP's inception, affordable housing
was in great demand which meant that all income levels were
suffering from affordability problems. Subsidies were desparately
required to assist these various income groups and SHARP benefits
were not wasted. At that time the mixed income format proved to
be the only approach which produced affordable housing.
Rhode Island's low income focused program is still in its
formative years and its concentration on non-profits has resulted in
expensive cost overruns. Dagata commented: "Rhode Island
Housing's over-reliance on nonprofits many times costs them more in
the long run than working with a for profit because of nonprofits
inexperience and lack of expertise." Although this sentiment was
generally accepted by private developers, it should be noted that
they are biased. The RHPP in Maryland was viewed by both agency
officials and developers to be an efficient use of funds and cost
effective. All of these programs have used successfully their
resources to maximize production of rental housing.
Adaptability
Rhode Island was experiencing some softness on the market
rate side as was Maryland, although to a much lesser extent. Yet
these conditions have not significantly affected their programs,
thereby calling for no immediate response. The SHARP program in
Massachusetts, on the other hand, has been gravely impacted by
market softness and in theory has responded well to the challenge.
The flexibility of the SHARP statute has enabled MHFA and EOCD to
change the rules and guidelines for SHARP competitions. One of the
most notable alterations has been a redirection away from a strong
market rate focus to a moderate income and low income focus.
SHARP in its traditional form can and will be used for developments
in strong local market areas, but in the majority of areas the new
changes were appropriate as the markets were weak. In practice,
however, many developers have been less than optimistic about the
new changes, believing the program has been entirely transformed.
A new program instituted in very uncertain and unfavorable times,
coupled with serious concerns as to the program marketability, did
not inspire aggressive or even curious interest on the part of the
developers that I interviewed.
Another theoretical adaptability of SHARP is its ability to
receive further funding if projects encounter difficulties. If, for
example, rents do not meet projections or it takes longer to meet
occupancy targets and operating deficits arise, MHFA is authorized to
request further funds from the legislature to increase the SHARP
subsidy. The provision of this safety cushion feature is predicated
obviously on the fact that the state is economically healthy and funds
are in abundance to allocate. Presently, SHARP needs $10 million to
cover existing project shortfalls, and with the state in a fiscal crisis
the program is threatened. Kelly commented on the budget situation:
I don't think anybody really anticipated or
could have anticipated that the state would
be going through the same kind of major
downturn that the properties would be going
through and that there wouldn't be a source
of revenue there. That part of it I don't think
crossed anybody's mind.
The programmatic decision by MHFA was to be aggressive, to
produce affordable units, and to provide the minimum amount of
funds necessary to make the project feasible in order to maximize
resources. However, having relied heavily on trending projections
with a small amount of operating cushion, adverse economic
conditions have underscored SHARP's limitation, namely a solid
funding source.
Rhode Island's RPP is much less prone to market fluctuations
due to its low income bias and although the state experienced a
deficit and cannot meet its obligation to the rental subsidy program,
the RPP did not suffer from lack of state resources due to one critical
characteristic, i.e., the targeted loan funds are not tied to legislature
appropriations as in Massachusetts or Maryland, but instead are
funded by the Corporation's reserves. MHFA did not have such
reserves as it has tried to develop aggressively and leverage its
reserves as much as possible.
The Corporation's independence and vast reserves enable it to
proceed with its low income housing program without the fear that it
will be undermined by state budgetary problems. In fact, the
Corporation for the last two years has assumed responsibility for the
states' commitment to the rental subsidy program. The advantage of
such a funding arrangement cannot be overemphasized. However,
the targeted loan fund if employed in a declining operating subsidy
fashion like SHARP encounters similar problems if projections are not
met. Yet, the RPP has more stringent guidelines than SHARP in
regards to providing an added cushion. Both programs require that
careful distinction be made as to what constitutes the minimum
subsidy required to make the project feasible and ensure success,
and what would merely subsidize a greedy developer. Rhode
Island's bad experience with profit developers in the mid-1980s may
have left imprints on processes and procedures.
Maryland enjoys a growing economy, healthy state fiscal
situation and a strong demand for low income housing. Steady
growth and development has not led to the overbuilding exhibited in
other part of the country. Like Rhode Island's RPP, the somewhat
soft market rate side does not affect RHPP for reasons already
discussed and the state has been generous in housing budget
allocations. RHPP was viewed favorably by many developers, but
the main complaint was lack of funds. Funding is tied to the
legislature, as in Massachusetts, and although Maryland is not
presently encountering fiscal problems, it may some day and that
reliance on state funds may interrupt the program.
It is noteworthy that not only is the source of funds an
important issue but so too is the form of the subsidy. All the
programs are in the practice of making loans yet the specific amount
and form of the loans differ. SHARP stipulates that the loan must be
the minimum amount necessary to ensure project feasibility and
serves as an interest payment write down subsidy, in other words an
operating subsidy. In turn the RHP in Rhode Island offers second
mortgages of up to $30,000 per unit at zero percent interest; if taken
as a lump sum up front, this serves as a construction loan which can
roll into a permanent loan, in effect, a development write down cost
or capital subsidy. Also the funds can be expended over time and
function like SHARP as an operating subsidy. Finally, Maryland
offers a loan with very flexible terms and rates and a $1 million cap
per project, which operates as a capital subsidy. This latter form of
subsidy is advantageous in that it assists in defraying costs
associated with what many consider to be one of the more riskier
phases of the development effort. One receives the funds up front;
terms and rates are negotiable and the money can be used to help
offset a variety of development costs. The main drawback to this
approach is that you are not able to service the project and its
affordability as you are with the operating subsidy. An operating
subsidy affords greater flexibility with the type of projects that one
can pursue. As implied, the key factor is the amount of resources
that a state has at its disposal. Ideally, one would have capital funds
that can be discounted up front and an operating subsidy that can be
injected into the project so that at any given instance one can employ
the better of the two resources and use the optimal combination for
the project.
State Support
The ability to acquire appropriations for affordable housing
programs and the form of funding (whether up front or a declining
operating subsidy) depends not only on the state's fiscal position but
also on the state's commitment to affordable housing and the
omnipresent political realities existing in the state. State support is
an indirect test of success. Massachusetts has enjoyed tremendous
support for its affordable housing programs, particularly SHARP.
When politicians can boast that approximately 9,500 units are
produced and the track record has been exemplary as SHARPs has
been, the band wagon will roll easily. The political state of affairs
concerning affordable housing in Massachusetts has produced an
extremely supportive legislature which provides annual
appropriations for housing contracts as stated by SHARP. Moreover,
Chapter 774 and Executive Order 215 provide statutory support for
the affordable housing effort, whereas Rhode Island and Maryland
lack these "sticks."
Maryland also enjoys support for its housing programs. In fact
this year the legislature approved a $50 million state funded housing
budget, the largest in Maryland's history. Yet, the RHPP is a one shot
deal where the capital loan is made and no further money is put into
the project. Also, the political environment in this state is more
conservative in this regard. The capacity of the program to adopt to
changing political factors seems much less secure than in
Massachusetts. The Rhode Island legislature enthusiastically
supports RPP (as well it should, for the Corporation funds the
program from its reserves) and has accepted the state's commitment
regarding the rental subsidy program for the last two years. State
support is evidenced but cannot match that of Massachusetts. It
remains to be seen what action the state will pursue when
Massachusetts' budgetary problems lessen. Undeniably political
considerations impact the funding decision as to amount and type.
Comparative analysis has illustrated several important points.
First, states pursue different programmatic options depending on a
variety of influencing variables. Second, there is no one universal
program that can be applied to all circumstances. In concurrence
with contingency theory, I feel one must discover a best fit with
one's environment. As times and circumstances change, so too must
programs adapt to meet new needs and demands. A state wishing to
re-evaluate its existing posture regarding housing or one desiring to
develop a program must deal with many issues.
Third, an overriding factor in policy issues, of course, is the
basic overall housing market. Research and analysis must be
conducted to ascertain the various market areas, i.e. market rate,
moderate and low income, and any subcategories, as well as the
forces impinging on these markets. One needs a firm understanding
and appreciation for the dynamics involved. The federal
government's policy concerning housing as well as the tax code and
any imminent changes must be factored into policy decisions. Other
important factors include concerns such as the state's fiscal situation
and overall economy, the political environment, and past history
with housing.
Fourth, it is essential to know one's resources and understand
that programs should not be designed in isolation or viewed as a
panacea. Fifth, state and local resources are too scarce to provide a
sufficient response to the growing demand let alone permit one to
believe that one program is the answer. A specific program like
SHARP needs to work in conjunction with other federal, state, and
local resources, such as the tax credit program, for example, in order
to be effective and produce a significant amount of affordable
housing.
Sixth, only after diligent analysis and consideration of the
above mentioned factors can one determine what should be the
housing finance agency's realistic objective. In formulating policy,
flexibility in some form needs to be incorporated in the program
whether it is through the statute, programmatic guidelines, terms
and rates, etc. Once again such decisions cannot be made
independently as one must consider such issues as the funding
source, other agency involvement, administrative and bureaucratic
experience, skill and staffing.
Seventh, an awareness of change to the environment is
mandatory if a program is to be adaptable and successful. Change
will eliminate some opportunities while simultaneously creating new
avenues and attention to this reality is a must. Expected and
unexpected change will affect the program in varying degrees.
Massachusetts experienced a soft market and a deficit and SHARP
adapted to the new situation but in doing so has transformed itself
programmatically from a market rate focus to a low to moderate
income orientation. In effect the original intent of SHARP ended as it
embarked on a new format given existing circumstances. This
example underscores a point made earlier that housing programs
have a limited life span.
As we enter the 1990s the federal government is discussing
various housing packages but many observers are skeptical of relief
in the near future. States cannot afford to bide their time in the
hope that the federal government will rescue them and provide the
much needed funding for affordable housing. States need to continue
to engage in activist pursuits, develop innovative programs, create
financing schemes, and most of all to learn from their own and
others' experiences.
Comparative analysis illustrated several points but I feel the
one which was highlighted was the fact that states cannot attempt to
solve the housing affordability crisis alone. They can provide some
valuable assistance but they need the support of the federal
government. Otherwise programs will be insufficient, discontinuous,
and opportunities will be lost, such as construction slowdowns when
it is cheaper to build due to competitive bidding but state funds are
unavailable as a result of fiscal problems. Federal government
support is crucial to the housing effort.
Ian Donald Terner and Thomas B. Cook succinctly stated the
issue in New Directions for Federal Housing Policy: The Role of the
States::
Thus, while the 50 states in general, and even
the most aggressive housing "activist" states
may never attain a primacy in the funding or
finance area relative to the potential of the
federal government, their period of activism
during the federal retreat may establish many
of the states as powerful and constructive
partners in any reconstituted federal housing
effort. This may likely not be true for all of
the states, some of which are still on the
sidelines waiting for the federal government
to resume the game. And still others of the
states may fall short of the role of active or
constructive partner, because of deficiences of
leadership, or competence, or both. States
may, at worst, offer the disservice of a clogged
or superfluous layer of bureaucracy, threaten-
ing the flow of funds and aid from federal
funding sources to local government and
private sector implementors. Nonetheless ...
states have shown commitment and growing
capacity to undertake major housing
initiatives.
In addition to the obstacles encountered by state programs, the last
two to three years since these authors' assessment have produced
new demands on state programs for the 1990s. Among these
challenges are changing housing markets and state fiscal conditions.
The creative capacity of states has been illustrated as they
have devised a variety of approaches and funding sources to cope
with their responsibilities. It was fortunate that the programs I
examined enjoyed relatively favorable environments in which to
develop. Undergoing the learning curve experience is difficult
enough without having to deal with other threatening factors.
Massachusetts experienced a tight housing market and the
Massachusetts Miracle was beginning to take shape. Maryland's and
Rhode Island's markets were strong, and while the former's economy
was stronger, the latter's rental program was not as dependent on
the fiscal condition of the state. Yet, times and conditions have
changed and these and other state programs conceived under similar
conditions will face new challenges for the 1990s. States must
continue to be entrepreneurial as changes in market conditions can
be problemmatic. For example, with mixed income oriented
programs when markets become soft it will be necessary for the
state to have the flexibility to adjust the program accordingly and
have the systems in place to assist the transition. States need to
undertake more seriously contingency planning so when the
unexpected happens, as it did in Massachusetts, a soft market
opportunity program can be instituted readily.
Moreover, budgetory problems can impose serious
interruptions and effectively terminate programs. Given this factor,
agencies will need to re-evaluate the aggressiveness in which they
use and leverage their reserves. Having sufficient reserves available
for program funding proved to be a major advantage for Rhode
Island Housing. Obviously, their reserves are excessive and most
agencies cannot hope or even desire to achieve such a level, but the
idea of storing reserves has merit: continuity is provided and
agencies can capitalize on market oppotunities such as decreased
condominium prices and construction costs. Thus, as can be seen,
states must be entrepreneurial to adapt to new challenges.
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Development
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Duffy, Patrick - Shelter Corporation
Ginsburg, James - President, The Waterford Group
Goodman, Robert - Director of the Office of Research and Information
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Greenlaw, Sheila - Director of Program and Policy Development,
National Council of State Housing Agencies
Henson, Dan - Struever Brothers, Eccles and Ross
Logan, Mary - Baltimore City Regional Planning Council
Massey, Patricia - Baltimore Housing Partnership
Montague, Valerie - Assistant to Director of the Office of Research
and Information Systems
Nenno, Mary - National Association of Housing Redevelopment
Officials
Phelps, Tana - Baltimore Housing Partnership
Tawa, Christopher - Administrator of Housing Finance (CDA)
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